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We provide an introduction to interactive belief systems from a qualitative and 
semantic point of  view. Properties of  belief hierarchies are formulated locally. Among the 
properties considered are "Common belief in no error" (which has been shown to have 
important game theoretic applications), "Negative introspection of common belief" (which 
plays a role in the epistemic foundations of correlated equilibrium), "Truth of common 
_  belief" and "Truth about common belief". The relationship between these properties is 
studied. 1. Introduction 
The structures that are most often used in the economics and computer science literature 
1 
to discuss interactive  beliefs/knowledge  are partition structures . Partition structures embody 
the S5 logic for individual beliefs, in particular the Truth Axiom, that is, the assumption that it 
is a necessaly truth (true in all possible worlds of the model) that no one has any false beliefs. 
While at the individual level the Truth Axiom  merely establishes an objective requirement of 
cornpatibility between the individual's bdiefs and the external world, at the intersubjective level 
it has strong implications: 
"The assumption that  Alice believes  (with probability  one)  that Bert  believes 
(with probability  one)  that  the  cat  ate  the canary  tells  us  nothing  about  what  Alice 
believes about the cat and  the canary themselves. But if  we assume instead that Alice 
knows that Bert knows that the cat ate the canary, it follows, not only that the cat in fact 
ate the canary, but that  Alice knows it, and therefore believes it  as  well"  (Stalnaker, 
1996, p. 153). 
As  Stalnaker  points  out  (1994,  1996)  there  is  an  important  conceptual  difference 
between a theory that builds S5 into the concept of  knowledge (which -Stalnaker  argues -is 
based on equivocating  between knowledge and  kdief)  and a theory  that describes epistemic 
conditions under which knowledge and belief coincide, and then considers the consequences of 
assuming those conditions. 
1 
See, for example, Aurnann (1976, 19871, Geanakoplos (1992),  Fagin er a1 (1995). 
1 In  this paper we discuss the semantic  approach to interactive beliefs  and  discuss  the 
main issues that arise when properties of  beliefs are defined locally, that is, with respect to the 
true or actual belief hierarchies. 
2. Interactive belief frames 
D E FI  N I T I0 N  1 . A KD45frame  for interactive beliefs (or frame, for short) is a tuple 
= ( N7  '7  '9  {pi}iEN  ) 
where 
N  = { 1, ..., n) is a finite set of individuals. 
G!  is a finite set of states (or possible worlds). The subsets of  52  are called  events. 
t  E  52  is the "true" or "actlial" state. 
Q  Q 
for every individual  i~  N, Pi : 52 -+ 2  \0  (where 2  denotes the set of  subsets of  Q)  is i's 
possibility correspondence satisfying the following properties (whose interpretation is given 
in Remark 3 below):  V a,  (3 E 52. 
Euclideanness:  if  (3  E P ((a)  then  Pi(a)  c_  Pi@). 
For every a€  Q, P,(a)  represents the set of states that individual i considers possible at a. R E MA  R K  1  (Graphical representation). A non-empty-valued and transitive 
n 
possibility correspondence P : i2 -+ 2  \(21 can be uniquely represented (see Figures 1-5) as an 
2 
asymmetric directed graph  whose vertex set consists of disjoint events (called cells and 
represented as rounded rectangles) and states, and each arrow goes from, or points to, either a 
cell or a state that does not belong to a cell. In such a directed graph, o' E P(co) if and only if 
either o  and o' belong to the same cell or there is an arrow from o,  or the cell containing o,  to 
o',  or the cell containing w'.  Conversely;-given a transitive directed graph in the above class 
such that each state either belongs to a cell or has an arrow out of  it, there exists a unique non- 
empty-valued, transitive possibility correspondence which is represented by  the directed graph. 
The possibility correspondence is  eucllidean  if  and only  if all arrows connect states to 
cells and  no state is connected  by  an arrow  1:o  more than one cell (for an example of  a non- 
euclidean possibility correspondence see the common possibility correspondence P,  of  Figure 3 
below). 
Finally,  if - in  addition - the  possibility  correspondence  is  reflexive  (o  E  P(o), 
'd Q)E Q), then one obtains a partition model where each state is contained in a cell and there are 
no arrows between cells. 
A directed graph is asymmernc if, whenever there is an arrow from vertex v to vertex v' then there is  no arrow 
from v' to v. EX  A M P  L  E  1 .  Figure  1  represents  the  following  frame  using  the  convention 
estabhhed in Remark 1:  N = (1, 21.  R  = {r.  (3,  y}. P,(r) = {r), PI(@)  = P,(y) = {P), P (r) = 
2 
P,($  = {r,  y}, P,(@ = {PI. 
I  ~nsert  Figure 1 I 
Figure  1 
e  n 
Given a frame and an individual  i, i's ber!ief operator Bi  : 2  -+ 2  is defined as follows: 
V E L;  R,  B,E  = /as  R : P,(a)  c E].  BiE  can be interpreted as the event that (i.e. the set of  states 
at which) individual i believes that event E has occurred. 
D E Fl  N  1 T 10 N  2. Beliefs pertain to propositions. Events, that is, subsets of  R  should 
be thought of  as representing propositions. In  order to establish the interpretation of  events as 
propositions we need to introduce the notion of a model based on a frame. 
We consider a language with n modal operators 0  ,, o,, ..., a , one for each individual. 
/ 
The :intended interpretation of  iq is "individual  i believes that @ ". The alphabet of  the 
language consists of: (1) a finite or countable set Il  of sentence letters (representing atomic 
propositions), (2) the connectives 7 (for "not"), v (for "or"), and, for every i~  N, O,,  (3) the bracket symbols  (  and  ). The set @  of formulae is obtained from the sentence letters by 
3 
closing with respect to negation, disjunction and the operators Oi.  As is customary, we shall 
often omit the outermost brackets [e.g. we shall write $ v I) instead of  ($  v I))] and use the 
following (metalinguistic) abbreviations: $ A 11,  for ~(-4  v l$) (the symbol A stands for 
"and"), (I +  +  for (+)  v $ (the symbol +  stands for "if.. . then .  .  . ") and  $I  w +  for ($ + 
I)) .A (+  -+ $) (the symbol e+  stands for "if anti only if "). 
- 
Given  a  frame 7  one  obtains  a  model  ??  based  on  it  by  adding  a  function 
e 
f  : 13  +  2  that associates with every sentence letter x the set of  statzs at  which  JC is true. For 
every  formula q E  @,  the truth set of  q in  V,  denoted  by  /I  @/I'n,  is  defined recursively  as 
m  ~f 9 = (x)  where x  is a sentence letter, then  I/ @ //  =f  (d, 
1  @  1  =  1  4  1  (with a  slight abuse of  notation, the symbol '7' is  also 
used to denote complement: 7E  = 9 \ E) 
For all i E N 
3 
Thus 0  is obtained recursively as follows:  (i) for every sentence letter n, (n)  E 0,  (ii) if 4, I)  E  Q  then 
(,$)  E  @, (9  v 1/, ) E 0  and, for every i E  N,  ([3,$) E  @ . If  w s  11 @  11  we say that  4  is me  at state w  in mou'el  ?'??  (an alternative notation for 
ws  11 4 11 ln  is  C "4  and an alternative notation for  w B  /I 4 11 ''  is  @:$  ).  A formula + is 
0 
valid in model  %$'  if  and only if  /I 4  11 "  = Q. 
Let  be a frame, E c  52  an event and  a model based on 7  where E is the truth set 
Q  a 
of some formula 4,  that is, E =  11 $11:  LaBi  : 2  +  2  be the belief operator of  individual i  (cf. 
Definition 2).  Then B,E is the truth set of  the formula Ell( . that is, BiE =  /I 0,$1/?  Hence the 
interpretation of  BIE  as the event that individual i believes E (or, more precisely, the proposition 
repxsented by event E). 
E X A M  P L  E  2.  Consider the frame of Figure 1 and a model based on it where ;t  is an 
atomic proposition  (e.g. "the universe is  expanding") which is  true at states y  and t:  // x/l  = 
{y, t].  The model is illustrated in  Figure 2.  Here the truth set of  O,n is  {t), while the truth set 
of  0  ,x  is {y, t). Thus the truth set of  @,0,x  is  {r).  The true state t describes a world where in 
fact  the  universe  is  expanding  and  both  individuds correctly  believe  that  it  is  expanding; 
however, while individual  1 believes that individual 2 believes that the universe is expanding, 
individual 2 is uncertain as to whether 1 (correcxly) believes that it is expanding or 1 incorrectly 
believes that it is not expanding  (11  0,1,71/  = (f3, 7))  and incorrectly attributes the same belief to 
individual 2  (11  U,D,lxI\  = {P. y). TX  n  n 
"the universe is  "the universe  "the universe 
NOT expanding"  is expanding"  is expanding" 
Figure  2 
B  e 
R E  MA  R K  2. Let P : R -+ 2'  be a possibility correspondence and B : 2  7- 2  the 
corresponding belief operator (that is, V E c  $2,  BE = {o~  R :  :(a)  c  E)). Then B satisfies the 
following properties: VE,F L  52, 
Necessity:  BQ =  !2 
Conjunction:  B(E n  F) = BE r\  BF 
Monotonicity:  ifEcF  then  BEGBF 
Q  e 
An operator B : 2  -+  2  that satisfies the above properties is called normal. Thus the operator 
that. is obtained from a possibility correspondence is always normal. Instead of  taking possibility 
Q  n 
correspondences as primitives, ode could stant with a normal belief operator B, : 2  -+ 2  for 
each individual i and obtain from it i's possibility correspondence as follows: Va  E R, Pi(a)  = {WE  R : a E 7~i7{w}).  The two approaches are equivalent, in the sense the two mappings are 
4 
one the inverse of the other. 
R E MA  R K  3.  Fix a frame y.  The following is well known (see Chellas, 1984, p. 164): 
1.  INon-empty valuedness of  Pi corresponds to1  consistency of i's beliefs: the following are 
equivalent.  - 
(i)  'dco~Q,P,(co)#0, 
(ii)  'd E c_ Q, BiE  c_ lBilE, 
(iii)  for every model ?'?I  based on Yand  for every formula +, the formula 
m 
Dl@ i  is valid in  %'?,  that is,  11 nip  -t -,Oi-4  /I = R  (individual i 
cannot simultaneously believe $  and not 9). 
2.  Transitivity  of  PI corresponds  to  posih've  inh-ospection  of  beliefs:  the  following  are 
equivalent 
(i)  Va,f3  E 52,  if  f3 E P,(a) then  .PI(@  c  Pl(a), 
.I  e  Q  a 
Let P : Q +  2  be a possibility correspondence, B : 2  +  2  the associated belief operator (V  E  Q. BE = 
a 
{O  E 52  : P(w) c  E]) and P':  !2  +  2  the possibility correspondence obtained from B (Va  E Q,  P'(a) = 
{WE Q : a E 7~7{~j}).  Then P' = P.  Conversely, let B be a belief operator, P the possibility correspondence 
obtained from B and B' the belief operator obtained from P. Then B = B'. (iii)  for every model  %'?  based on :f and for every formula $, the formula 
Oi$ i;  U.U$  is valid in  (if the individual believes E then she believes 
that she believes E). 





Va,P  E  52,  if  P E Pi(a) then  Pi(a)  c  Pi(@), 
V E c  R, 7BiE r  B~~B~E', 
For every model m  based on ,Fand  for every formula 4, the formula 
TOi$ i;  UiTO  is valid in  ?'?7'  (if the individual does not believe E, then 
she believes that she does not believe E). 
Notice  that  we  have  allowed  for  f,alse beliefs  by  not  assuming  reflexivity  of  the 
po,ssibility correspondences [Yo  E 9,  o E  Pl(o)],  which - as is well known (Chellas, 1984, p. 
164) - is equivalent to the Truth Axiom: YE c  52,  B,E c  E  (if the individual believes E then E 
is indeed true). 
The common belief operator B,  is defined as follows. First, for every Ec  Q, let BeE = 
B.E,  that  is, BeE is the event  that everybody believes E. The event that E is commonly 
~;IV 
/ 
believed is defined as the infinite intersection: Q 
The corresponding common possibility correspondence P,:  Q +  2  \ 0 is given by:  for 
5 
ever), a€  Q, P,(a) = {o  E $2 : a E -B,T{w}].  It is well known  that  P, can be characterized 
as the  transitive closure  of  U  4 , that is, 
IGN 
Va,p  E  Q,  E P,(a) if and only if  there is a sequence ( i,. ... im) in N and 
a sequence (q,,  q,, ..., q,)  in Q such that:  (ii q, = a, (ii) q,  = p and (iii) for 
every  k = 0, ..., m-  1,  qk+l~  P.  (qJ. 
'k+l 
- 
REMARK 4.  Note that, although P,  is always non-empty-valued and transitive, in 
general it need not be euclidean (despite the fact that the individual possibility correspondences 
are: for an example see Figure 3; recall that  -cf.  Remark 3 - P,  is euclidean if  and only if B, 
satisfies Negative Introspection: V E c  Q,  7B,E  c  S,7B,T.) 
R  E  MA  R  K 5.  In order to capture the notion of  common belief in a model, one needs 
to extend the language by adding another operator 0,.  If  cp is a formula, the intended 
interpretation of  O,$ is "it is common belief that 9 " and the truth set of  O,q  is given by B,E 
= {o  E  S2  : P,(co)  E), where E is the truth set of  9. 
E  X A  M  P L E 3. Consider again the frame of Figures 1 and 2. The common possibility 
correspondence is given by P,(P) = {P)  and P,(y) = P,(t) = (13, y, 7).  Figure 3 illustrates P,  and 
/ 
the model of  Figure 2 with the extended language that includes the common belief operator 0,. 
5 
See, for example, Bonanno (1996),  Fagin et a1  (1995). Halpem and Moses (1992).  Lismont and Mongin (1994, 
1996). These authors also show that the common belief operator can be alternatively defined by  means of  a finite At state y individual 1 wrongly believes that it. is common belief that the universe is not 
expanding; hence, since y E P,(t), at state t in.dividua1  2 considers it possible that individual 1 
has such incorrect beliefs (~0~70,  0,7n  is true at t). 
~n  x  x 
"the universe is  "the universe  "the universe 
NOT expanding"  is expanding"  is expanding" 
REMARK 6. 
Figure  3 
A proposition is commonly believed if  and only if  everybody 
believes that it is commonly believed: for every E  9,  B,E  = n  BiB,E. 
icN 
- 
list of  axioms, rather than as an infinite conjunction. 3. Properties of beliefs: (1) common belief in no error 
Properties of interactive beliefs are to be: defined locally, i.e. with respect to the true state 
t.  An equivalent, and mathematically more elegant, alternative is to define a property as an 
event, i.e. a set of states; the property is then satisfied at the true state z if and only if  z belongs to 
that event. A characterization result will correspondingly be stated as the equality of  two events. 
Let Ti  (for Truth of  i's beliefs) befhe folllowing event: 
Thus,,  for every a E  Q, a E Ti  if and only if individual i is correct in everything she believes 
(for every E G Q, if a E BiE then a E E)  . It is well known that a€  Ti  if and only if a E  P.(a)  (for 
example, in the frame of  Figure 1, T, = {P, TI, while T, = 9).  It follows that a€  BiTi  if and only 
if, for all PE Pi(a),  PE Pi@).  By negative introspection of i's beliefs (euclideanness of  Pi : see 
Remark 3) this property is satisfied at every state, that is, for every individual i, BITi  = Q 
Negative introspection prevents an individual from considering it possible that her own beliefs 
are false. On the other hand, there is nothing in  [he definition of frame that prevents an individual 
from, attributing false beliefs to another individual. For example, in the model of  Figure 2 
y E. P2(y)  n -TI: at state y  individual 2 considers it possible that individual 1 has the wrong 
/ 
belief that the universe is not expanding. Let T (for Truth) be the following event: 
5 
Thus, for every a E 9,  a E T if and only if  no individual has any false beliefs at a  . For 
exa.mple, in the frame of  Figure 1, T = {P, t) and, therefore, B,T = {P). We call B,T  the event 
tha,t there is common belief in no error. This property has recently been shown to have important 
- 
implications in the epistemic foundation of  solution concepts in game theory (see, for example, 
Ben Porath, 1992, Stalnaker, 1994, 1996, Stuart, 1996). Proposition 1 below highlights some of 
the intersabjective implications of  common belief in no error. 
Given two individuals,  i and j, and a state a,  we say that  i is  like-minded  with j at a if 
and only if i shares all the beliefs that she attributes to j, that is, for every event E, if  a E  BiB.E 
I 
then a E  BiE. Let Lij  be the evxt  that i is like minded with j: 
Let L be the event that every individual is like-minjed with every other individual: 
5 
asT  if and only if at n  p, (a)  . It follows that as  I3.T  if and only if, for all PE  P,(a), Pt n  4  (P) 
re  iV  ,EN 
13 Note that, in general, like-mindedness and correctness of beliefs are unrelated properties, 
6 
that is, in general T S L and L  T .  However, it is a consequence of negative introspection of 
individual beliefs that  public like-mindednes:~  and public correctness of  beliefs coincide (for a 
proof of Proposition 1 see Bonamo and Nehring, 1997b). 
PROPOSITION 1.  B,L  = B,T. 
- 
Thus common belief in no error is equivalent to common belief that every individual 
shares all the beliefs that she attributes to other individuals. 
When the S5 logic  is  postulated  for  individual  beliefs,  then  one obtains  a  partitional 
frame where T = B,T  = 5'2.  One can capture the Truth Axiom (V  E c_ 9,  'd i  E  N,  B,E c  E) as a 
local property of  beliefs as follows. 
D E F  l N l  T I0  N 3. For every  a€  52, the Truth Axiom hold at a if  and only if 
a E T n  B,T. 
The above definition is justified by the followimg observation. Given a frame (N, 8.  T,  { P.  iiCN  ), 
I 
6 
Example 1: consider the following frame N = (1.2}, Q = {t. P },  Pl(r)  =PI@)  = (t},  P2@) = P,(d  -  = {t,  PI. 
'Then T = (t}  while L = 0.  Example 2: in the frame N = (1.21,  Q = (r.  P}, P,(w) = {P} for all i  E N and 
w E  Q,  T = {PI,  while L = Q. define the r-reducedfiame as the frame (N,  R '  , r,  { P,'  lie, ) where 52' = P,(r) u {t}  and P,'  is 
the restriction of  Pi to Q'. Let B:  be the corresponding belief operator of individual i and  Pi  the 
corresponding common possibility corresponclence. Then Pi  is the restriction of  P,  to  52'  [in 
particular, Pi (r  ) = P,(r)] and for every E' c  S2'  B: E' = BE' n  9'. If  ( N,  Q , r. { P  IiGN  ) is a 
1 
frake  where z E T n B,T,  then in the t-reduced frame the following is true: V i~ N, VE' c  Q', 
B: E' c  E'  (note, however, that in the originall frame in general it is not true that V i~  N, V Ec52, 
BiE3 c  E: see Figure 4a). Thus the t-reduced frame is a partitional frame (unlike the original frame, 
in general). Figure 4b shows the t-reduced frame corresponding to the frame of  Figure 4a. 
/ 
Figure  4a  Figure  4b 
A weaker property than common belief in no error is Agreement, defined as the common 
possibility of public like-mindedness and den.oted by A: The term "Agreement" is  justified  by  the fact  that  this  weaker  property  is  equivalent to the 
impossibility of "agreeing to disagree" about qualitative belief  indices (for a proof see Bonanno 
and Nehring, 1997b). 
To gain further insight into the property  of common belief  in  no error  and  the Truth 
Axiom  we  introduce  two  more  properties  that,  together  with  Agreement,  provide  a 
decclmposition of the Truth Axiom. 
* 
Let T,,  (for Truth about common belief) and T  ( for Truth of  common belief) be the 
follclwing events 
T,,  captures  the  notion  that  individuals are correct  in  their  beliefs  about what  is  commonly 
believed: a E TCB  if  and only if, for every event E and individual i.  if, at a,  individual i believes 
that E is commonly believed, then, at a,  E is  indeed commonly believed  (if  ~EB,B,E  then 
* 
a<  E3,E).  On the other hand, as  T  if  and only if at a whatever is commonly believed is true (for 
/ 
every event E,  if a~  B,E  then a€  E) '. Clearly, Truth of  common belief  is qualitatively weaker 
7  1 
It is straightforward that aET  if and only if, a€  P,(a). *  * 
than Truth; given  that  B,T  =  52,  T  can  be  viewed as  Truth shorn of  any  intersubjective 
implications. 
The following proposition gives a decomposition of the Truth Axiom in terms of  quasi- 
coherence, Truth of  common belief and  (common belief of) Truth about common belief  (for a 
proof see Bonamo and Nehring, 1997b). 
* 
PROPOSITION 2.  TnB,T  =  T n B,T,,nA.  - 
* 
R E MA  R  K  7.  None of  T , TcB  and B,TcB, either individually or in conjunction with 
* 
the others, has any "agreement" implications. This can be seen from Figure 5 where T  = TCB  = 
B,T,,  = 52  and yet at both t and 13  the individuals agree to strongly disagree, in the sense that it 
Is  common belief  that individual 2 believes  1:  and individual 1 believes not E, where E = {t): 
B,(BI7E n  B,E)  = B .  On the other hand, as remarked before, A is precisely the property that 
rules out such phenomena. 
Figure  5 4. Properties of beliefs: (2) negative introspection of common belief 
As noted in  Remark 4, the common possibility correspondence  P,  satisfies non-empty- 
valuedness and transitivity  but not euclideanness.  It  follows  (cf. Remark  3) that  the common 
belief  operator  B,  satisfies  consistency  (B,E  c  TB,TE)  and  positive  introspection  (B,E  c 
8 
B,EI,E)  but  not  necessarily  negative  introspection  bB,E  c  B,TB,E).  Thus  Negative 
Introspection of  common belief  implies intersubjective restrictions on beliefs. The purpose of  - 
this section is to find out what these restrictions are. 
Let (NI stands for "Negative Introspection") 
Thus a E NI if and only if  - for every event E - whenever at a it is not common belief that E, 
then, at a, it is common belief that E is not co~mmonly  believed  (if a E TB,E  then a E B,lB,E). 
9 
REMARK 8. a~  M  if andonly if,  Vf3, y  E  P,(a),  P,(p). 
The following propositions are proved in Bonanno and Nehring (1997a). 
8 
For example, in the frame of  Figure 3, jet  E = ((3). Then B,E  = {PI.  Hence 43,E = {y. *t] and B,YB,E  = 0.  Thus 
9 
ProoJ  (i) Suppose that (3.y  E P,(a) and y E P,((3). Let E = P,((3). Since y E P,(a) n 7E,  P,(a)  E, that is, 
cr  E -B,E.  Since P,((3) = E, (3 E  B,E.  Hence, since (3 E  P,(a), P,(a) n  B,E  # 0,  that is, a E  lB,~B,E.  Thus 
cr  E -B,E  n yB,lB,E.  Hence a E NI.  (ii) Conversely. suppose that a E NI. Then there exists an E G 52 PROPOSITION 3.  NI  = T,,  n B,T,,. 
According to Proposition 3, Negative Introspection of common belief hinges on common 
k~~owledge  of truth restricted to beliefs about common belief. One may wonder whether there is 
something qualitatively different about the truth of this very special type of  beliefs. This question 
can be answered affirmatively, in that truth about common belief is necessary and sufficient for 
individuals' beliefs about common belief to coincide:  we call this "Shared Worlds". (By 
- 
coimparison, having correct beliefs about what others believe, in general, does not imply sharing 
their beliefs.)  Let SW be the following event: 
SVV  captures the notion that individuals agree on what is commonly believed:  a E SW if  and 
only if, for every event E, whenever one individual believes that it is common belief that E, then 
10 
every other individual believes that too  . 
PROPOSITION 4.  SW  =T,,. 
such that a E  TB,E  n -B,-IB,E.  j5ince a E 7B,7B,E,  there exists a (3 E P,(a) such that P E B,E,  that is, 
P,@)  E. Since a C  B,E,  there exists a y E P,(a) such that y c E. Hence y c  P,((3). 
10 
Note that a E SW requires that at a  the individuals share the same "model of  the world"  Q,(a)  5 
U  1,  (a)  , that is, a E SW  if and only if for all i , j E  N,  Q,(a)  = Q (a).  Note that common belief in 
1 
adi  (a) 
Shared Worlds rules out, by definition. even uncertainty about the others' model of  the world, as the following 
example shows: N  = { 1,2), Q = (7. 0,  yj. I,(d = {TI,  11((3)  = I,($  = {PI,  I,(d = Iz(y)  = It. y}. IZ@)  = (PI. Thus 
I*(T)  = I.(y)  = {t,  (3,  y) and  I*(P)  = ((3).  Here SW = {T,  (3  }.  However, while t E SW, t E B-SW = {pi:  at t (and 
-{)  individual 2 is uncertain as to whether 1's persa~nal  model is  {(3} or 9. Finally, since NI can be viewed as describing the "logic" of common belief, a global (or 
"axiomatic") version of  Proposition 3 which incorporates Proposition 4 is of some interest. It is 
provided in the following corollary. 
COROLLARY 1.  NI=Q if and only if SW=P  'I. 
5.  Conclusion 
- 
This paper reviewed the semantic approach to belief and common belief. Properties such 
as common belief  in no error and Negative Introspection of  common belief  were examined and 
decomposed into further properties of  individua.1 beliefs. For the syntactic approach to belief and 
common belief the reader is referred to Bonamo (1996), ~agin  et a1  (1995), Halpern and Moses 
(1992),  Lismont and Mongin (1994, 1996). 
A companion paper discusses the importance of  the properties considered above for the 
epistemic foundations of solution concepts in game theory. In particular, Negative Introspection 
of  common  belief  plays  a  role  in  the  extension  of  Aumam's  (1987) characterization  of 
correlated equilibrium to situations of  incomplete information, while common belief  in no error 
plays a role in the justification for backward induction in  an important class of  extensive-form 
games, which includes the finitely  repeated prisoners' dilemma and the centipede game. A third 
paper  examines  the  intersubjective  interpretation  of  the  Common  Prior  Assumption  in  the 
context of  incomplete  information  and  various  generalizations of  the  notion  of  "agreeing  to 
disagree" introduced by Aumann (1976). 
/ 
I  I 
That is, (i) and  (ii) below are equivalent: 
(i)  VEcQ,  7 B*E C  B*?B*E, 
(id  Vi,j~N,VEcf2,  B  B*E C  B B*E. References 
Au~mann,  R. (1976),  Agreeing to disagree, Annals of Statistics, 4, 1236-1239. 
Au~mann, R.  (1987),  Correlated  equilibrium  as  an  expression  of  Bayesian  rationality, 
Economenica, 55, 1-18. 
Ben-Porath,  E.  (1992), Rationality,  Nash  equilibrium  and  backward  induction  in  perfect 
information games, mimeo, Tel Aviv 1Jniversity. 
Bonamo, G.  (1996), On the logic of  common belief, Mathematical Logic Quarter&, 42, 305- 
311. 
~onamo,  G.  and  Nehring,  K.  (1997a),  On  the  logic  of  common  belief:  two  local 
characterizations  of  negative  introspection,  Working  Paper,  University  of  California, 
Davis. 
Bonanno,  G.  and  Nehring,  K.  (1997b),  Assessing  the  Truth  Axiom  under  incomplete 
information, Working Paper, University of California, Davis.. 
Chellas, B. (1984),  Modal logic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Fagin, R., J. Halpern, Y. Moses and M. Vardi  (1995),  Reasoning about knowledge,  MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
Geanakoplos, J. (1992).  Common knowledge, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6,53-82. 
Halpem, J. and Y. Moses (1992), A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of 
knowledge and belief, Artificial intelli;:ence, 54, 319-379. 
Lismont, L.  and  P. Mongin  (1994). On  the logic of  common belief  and common  knowledge, 
Theoly and Decision, 37, 75-106. 
Lismont, L.  and  P.  Mongin  (1995), Belief  closu~e:  a semantics for common knowledge  for 
modal propositional logic, Mathematical Social Sciences, 30, 127-  153. 
Stahaker, R. (1994),  On the evaluation of  solution concepts, Theory and Decision, 37, 49-74. 
Stalnaker, R. (1996), Knowledge! belief and counterfactual reasoning in games, Economics and 
Philosophy, 12, 133-163. 
Stuart, H.  (1996), Common belief  of  rationality  in  the finitely repeated  Prisoners'  Dilemma, 
mimeo, Harvard Business School. 